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Hinduism and Science [Science in the published version]
C. Mackenzie Brown

In Hindu temples and cultural centers around the world, a visitor today often encounters
not only traditional images of the gods and goddesses of the Hindu pantheon, but also a myriad
of posters, panoramas, and brochures extolling the scientific discoveries of ancient Indian,
particularly Hindu, seers and scientists.

These include discoveries in medicine, chemistry,

metallurgy, astronomy, and technology.

For instance, the newly constructed, magnificent

Swaminarayan Akshardham temple in Delhi boasts of a Disney-like underground boat ride
during which visitors view displays of “the discoveries and inventions of the rishi-scientists of
India” (Akshardham, 2005). Two of the dioramas “feature plastic surgery and a helicopter,
showing the scientific advances of early Hindus” (Hamilton, 2011). I first encountered this
phenomenon at the Hindu Temple of San Antonio. The Temple has displayed a number of
science-posters published by the Hindu Swayamsevak Sangh, USA. One such poster cites the
fifth-sixth century Indian mathematical astronomer Āryabhaṭa as effectively proposing the
heliocentric model of the solar system (see fig. 1); another poster proclaims that Ayurveda
“originated in the Vedas” (see fig. 2).
The point of these science displays and literature is clear: Hinduism is scientific in spirit,
has a long history of scientific discovery, is fully compatible with modern science, and—though
not always stated in such contexts—the most scientific religion in the world. This latter claim,
with specific reference to the monistic strand of Hinduism known as Advaita Vedānta, was made
famous by Swami Vivekananda (1863-1902) at the World’s Parliament of Religions held in
Chicago in 1893 (Brown, 2011, 209). The theme of harmony between Hinduism and modern
science has become an important expression of contemporary Hindu identity and cultural self1

affirmation and is a common perception especially among urban professional Hindus in the U.S.
and in India. This view, along with such notions that Hinduism is more a way of life than a
religion and that Hinduism stresses religious tolerance, “have become so common that they
comprise a ‘generic Hindu’ outlook that is unique to the late twentieth century” (Narayanan,
2006, 244).
The posters, dioramas, and brochures proclaiming the full harmony of Hinduism and
science offer to many Hindus today a contrastive view to the notion of conflict between religion
and science frequently seen as characterizing the relation of the Abrahamic traditions to modern
science. But such models of harmony or conflict suffer from oversimplification. Both “are
really hasty generalizations: there is indeed conflict in some historical periods, but not in others;
and the same is true for harmony,” according to historian and philosopher of science Maurice
Finocchiaro (2001, 114). In addition, both models “tend to presuppose definitions of science and
religion which are essentialist, anachronistic, or unhistorical” (Finocchiaro, 2001, 114).
There is currently a predisposition on the part of Hindu cultural nationalists to provide just
such essentialist and unhistorical definitions of both religion and science. They regard Hinduism
as the sanātanadharma (the eternal law, both moral and natural) consisting of truths, principles,
and foundational norms that are universal and unchanging. But historically we find a breadth of
Hindu perspectives on science, each with its own particular epistemological assumptions and
metaphysical framework. These different assumptions and frameworks, themselves changing
over time, have significantly impacted the various Hindu conceptions of what constitutes reality,
on one hand, and science on the other. In this essay I will use the term Hinduism in its broadest
sense to cover developments from the vedic period down to the present.
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A nuanced and comprehensive understanding of the “Hinduism-science” relationship
requires an examination of the social and historical contexts in which the classical and modern
Hindu perspectives on science have developed, with special attention to their epistemological
assumptions regarding knowledge about the empirical world. Comparison of these epistemic
views with the methodological ideals and assumptions of modern science reveals a complex
interaction between Hinduism and science that transcends any simplistic notion of harmony or
conflict. Additional insights into the historic and contemporary tensions between Hinduism and
science will be provided by looking beyond their respective metaphysical and epistemological
assumptions to the underlying cognitive foundations of each.

Epistemological Tensions
Let us begin our investigation of the epistemological issues by returning to Swami
Vivekananda, who claimed that ancient vedic (Hindu) seers had discovered many truths about
both the spiritual and empirical realms. How did they make such discoveries? With reference to
various ancient scientific yogis, including Kapila, legendary founder of the Sāṃkhya and
discoverer of “evolution,” the Swami claims:
How wonderful his perceptions were, and if there is any proof required of the extraordinary
power of the perception of Yogis, such men are the proof. They had no microscopes or
telescopes. Yet how fine their perception was, how perfect and wonderful their analysis of
things! (Vivekananda, 2003, vol. II, 445)
Vivekananda here reveals a major epistemic tension between his Neo-Advaitin perspective and
the methodological approaches of modern science. The former privileges superconscious insight
into the subtle workings of the material world, aided by an intuitive-deductive analysis, resulting
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in certain knowledge. Modern science emphasizes a constant interplay between hypothesis
formulation and empirical testing rooted in recognition of the primacy of sensory observation,
itself increasingly extended by sophisticated scientific instrumentation.

But the resulting

scientific conclusions, aided by logical deductions, are ultimately rooted in inductions based on
empirical data and thus remain, at least in principle, forever tentative.
An elder contemporary of Vivekananda, the Hindu nationalist writer B. Chattopadhyaya
(1838-1894) called attention to this epistemic tension in a blistering critique of ancient and
classical Hindu approaches to understanding the natural world.

While noting that Hindu

philosophy traditionally “was co-extensive in meaning with the knowledge of Nature” and
“therefore included Science,” he went on to observe:
The Hindu laboured under the disadvantage of an erroneous method.

An intense

theological spirit rarely leads to anything but the deductive method, and the Hindu method
was almost solely and purely deductive. Observation and Experiment were considered
beneath the dignity of Philosophy and Science. Nor is even deduction as a rule pushed on
its legitimate consequences. First principles are assumed on no grounds, and with the most
perfect weapons of deductive logic at his command, the Hindu thinker contents himself
with the most fanciful inferences. (Chattopadhyaya,1969, 146)
B. Chattopadhyaya, with his Positivist leanings, was naturally not willing to accept any
superconscious technique like yogic perception as a valid means of knowledge.
To illustrate the difference between traditional Hindu approaches and that of modern
science, B. Chattopadhyaya cited the example of the Italian mathematician and scientist,
Evangelista Toricelli (1608-1647), inventor of the mercury barometer. Toricelli, aware that
gardeners in Florence had been unable to raise water with a suction pump higher than ten meters,
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reflected that the weight of the atmosphere on the water outside might be sustaining the column
of water in the pump tube. He then figured that the same pressure should raise mercury in a tube
as well, which he confirmed upon further investigation. And then Blaise Pascal, realizing that
there is less atmospheric pressure at higher altitudes, took a column of mercury up a mountain
and noted the lower rise of the mercury in the tube. B. Chattopadhyaya concludes:
A Hindu philosopher in Torricelli's place would have contented himself with simply
announcing in an aphoristic sutra that the air had weight. No measure of the quantity of its
pressure would have been given; no experiment would have been made with the mercury;
no Hindu Pascal would have ascended the Himalayas with a barometric column in hand.
(Chattopadhyaya, 1969, 146-147)
Turning next to a parallel Indian example, B. Chattopadhyaya notes that the idea of the
Earth’s diurnal rotation, mentioned in the Aitareyabrāhmaṇa, was later affirmed by the great
Indian astronomer Āryabhaṭa (b. 476 CE) in his great astronomical work, the Āryabhatīya. B.
Chattopadhyaya quotes the famous astronomer: “The starry firmament is fixed…it is the earth
which, continually revolving, produces the rising and the setting of the constellations and the
planets” (1969, 147). But then, B. Chattopadhyaya sadly observes, the only “legitimate”
conclusion from these and related “facts,” namely the heliocentric model of the solar system,
“was never positively put forward—never sought to be proved—never accepted and never
followed out to the establishment of further laws of the universe” such as Kepler’s laws and the
“great law of Universal Gravitation” (1969, 147).
Despite B. Chattopadhyaya dismissal of Āryabhaṭa’s proclaiming any robust heliocentrism,
there are frequent claims today on the World Wide Web that Āryabhaṭa had proposed the
heliocentric theory one thousand years before Copernicus (e.g., “Aryabhatta,” 2008; and “Indian
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Astronomy,” 2005), as well as on science posters such as the one at the Hindu Temple of San
Antonio noted earlier. A more serious scholarly argument affirming Āryabhaṭa’s heliocentrism
has been put forward by the Dutch mathematician, B.L. van der Waerden. To be sure, van der
Waerden (1970, 5) acknowledges that Āryabhaṭa did not expressly put forth a heliocentric
system, but argues that even apart from his idea of the Earth’s daily rotation, other parts of
Āryabhaṭa’s system indicate that it is based on a heliocentric model. But N. Swerdlow (1973,
241), an historian of ancient astronomy, rejects van der Waerden’s claim as demonstrating “a
complete misunderstanding of Indian planetary theory and is flatly contradicted by every word of
Āryabhaṭa’s description”.

Indeed, while Āryabaṭa recognized the relativity of motion as

accounting for the appearance of the stationary stars moving westward for an observer on the
equator of the rotating Earth (Āry. 4.9), he also described the spherical earth as “situated in the
center of space, in the middle of the circle of asterisms, surrounded by the orbits of the planets”
(Āry. 4.5; trans. Clark, 1930, 64 [=4.6]). Even more explicitly, he sets forth the typical ancient
geocentric model in which the sun occupies the fourth celestial sphere—between Mars and
Venus—above the stationary earth at the bottom or center, which Āryabhaṭa likens to a threshing
post to which are tied circling oxen, representing the celestial bodies: “Below the asterisms lie
Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, the sun, Venus, Mercury, and the moon, while the earth is below all of
these, like a threshing post, in the center of space” (Āry. 3.15; my trans.). And he utilizes
epicycles (vṛttas) to explain various planetary phenomena, epicycles being relevant only in
geocentric schemes of the universe (Āry. 3.19-21). Āryabaṭa further states that the asterisms
with the planets are blown westward by the “planetary wind” (pravaha; Āry.4.10). Thus his
proposal of a rotating Earth is irrelevant to the rest of his work, neither simplifying nor helping to
explain any other ideas in the Āryabhaṭīya (Chattopadhyaya, 1996, 33). He seems to have taken
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the idea of a planetary wind, and possibly even the axial rotation of the Earth, from puranic
cosmology, without integration into the rest of his mathematical astronomy (Chattopadhyaya,
1996, 33). W.G. Clark, commenting on Āryabhaṭa’s claim for a rotating Earth and stationary
asterisms, notes: “Later writers attack him bitterly on this point.

Even most of his own

followers…refused to follow him in this matter and reverted to the common Indian tradition” of
a stationary Earth (Clark, 1930, xiv). Thus W.G. Clark confirms in part Bankimchandra’s own
assessment of the lack of scientific temper—or at least scientific perseverance— in ancient India.
In one sense, the exact nature and validity of Āryabhaṭa’s propositions, especially as
judged by modern criteria, are beside the point and may distract from the underlying
methodological issues at stake. To illuminate such issues, we need to turn to the social and
cultural contexts in which Āryabhaṭa, and other ancient Indian scientists, carried out their work.
Let me pose three questions directly relevant to any discussion of the Hindu-science relationship
in ancient India, and which will help illuminate aspects of the contemporary Hinduism and
science discourse. These questions are the following: (1) To what extent did ancient Indian
sciences derive from vedic religion? (2) To what extent was ancient Indian science Hindu
science? And (3) to what extent did ancient Indian science share, not necessarily the conclusions
of modern science, but its methodological perspective? We shall begin with a look at ancient
Indian astronomy and Āryabhaṭa’s special role in the history of that science, and then look
briefly at ancient Indian medicine.

Hinduism and Astronomy in Ancient India
B.V. Subharayappa, historian and philosopher of science, regards ancient Indian astronomy
as derived from vedic seers.

He first emphasizes that the vedic sages had an intuitive
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understanding of the universe as an ordered cosmos governed by “Vedic natural laws”
encompassing both the moral and physical realms (Subharayappa, 2011, 196). Within this
framework of vedic natural laws, astronomy assumed great importance to the vedic priests for
ascertaining the proper times for various ritual and sacrificial performances. B.V. Subharayappa
thus concludes: “Vedic astronomers generally belonged to a priestly class” who engaged in
“prolonged observation of recognizable star-groups” (Subharayappa , 2011, 197). Turning to
Āryabhaṭa, B.V. Subharayappa observes that his astronomical treatise, the Āryabhaṭīya, “states
that the science of astronomy is a revelation from the creator Brahma, but apart from this passing
allusion, there are no further references to religion” (Subharayappa , 2011, 197). (Āryabhaṭa
declares that “this universally true science of astronomy… formerly was revealed by Svayambhū
[Brahmā]” [Ary. 4.50; trans. Clark, 1930, 81].) Given the lack of references to religion, one is
left wondering how vedic, or Hindu, Āryabhaṭa’s astronomy really was—and perhaps how vedic
the astronomy of ancient India in general was.
The great historian of ancient Indian science, D. Chattopadhyaya, takes a very different
view of Indian astronomy, and of the astronomers of vedic times in particular. Like B.V.
Subharayappa, D. Chattopadhyaya notes that the early astronomical texts—those of jyotiṣa, the
Vedāṅga (“limb of the Vedas”) dealing with astronomy—were used by vedic priests for
determining auspicious times for their ritual performances. And he acknowledges that these
texts also record remarkable observations of the positions and movements of the sun, moon, and
various constellations. He regards those who made such observations as “taking the first step to
astronomy” (1996, vi). But D. Chattopadhyay next claims that it could not have been the vedic
priests themselves who took this step, as their theoretical orientation was quite different, being
“quasi-religious and quasi-magical” (1996, vii).

He points out that the priestly literature
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repeatedly condemns direct observation in preference for “the obscure and mystic” (1996, vii).
He speculates that the observational astronomical tradition pre-dates the arrival of the vedic
peoples in India, and was possibly derived from the agricultural Indus Valley Civilization, where
such observations were necessary for creating a farmer’s calendar (1996, viii).
As for Āryabhaṭa, D. Chattopadhyaya, like B.V. Subharayappa, calls attention to the
astronomer’s statement that the science of astronomy was of divine origin (1996, x). But D.
Chattopadhyaya notes a different tone in the Āryabhatīya text that B.V. Subharayappa overlooks,
a tone that provides an explanation for why, in B.V. Subharayappa’s words, “there are no further
references to religion.” As D. Chattopadhyaya explains:
…as contrasted with the prevailing practice of proclaiming the astronomical views as but
divine revelation Aryabhata boldly asserted that his book was of human origin, i.e. worked
out by himself. This he announced in the very title he chose for his book, Aryabhatiya.
(Chattopadhyaya, 1996, x)
D. Chattopadhyaya further points out Āryabhaṭa’s delcaration (see Āry. 4.49) that his astronomy,
while it might be from the grace (prasāda) of God, was actually “the product of his own intellect
[mati]” (Chattopadhyaya, 1996, x).
D. Chattopadhyaya extols Āryabhaṭa’s achievement as surpassing that of all European
astronomers until the time of Copernicus. Yet as D. Chattopadhyaya and W.G. Clark have
pointed out, Āryabhaṭa was largely neglected by his Indian successors. Chattopadhyaya argues
that the subsequent ignoring of Āryabhaṭa’s work was due to his disregard of the prevailing
“Brahmanical speculations and assumptions” (Chattopadhyaya, 1996, xi). Such disregard, D.
Chattopadhyaya proposes, may well have been due to Āryabhaṭa’s low-caste status, a status
indicated by the “Bhaṭa” in his name. D. Chattopadhyaya then asks, might not Āryabhaṭa, being
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possibly subjected to discriminatory treatment under Brahmanical class norms, have become
“cynical of Brahmanical orthodoxy as such, and discarding the theological bias of the divine
origin of astronomy worked for the development of a secular view of the science?”
(Chattopadhyaya, 1996, xi). D. Chattopadhyaya finally suggests that Āryabhaṭa might have
gained his remarkable learning and intellectual independence by accepting the Buddhist
teachings that shunned prejudice against the lower castes. While D. Chattopadhyaya admits that
such a suggestion is hard to confirm, he claims it is bolstered by the fact that another member of
the low caste, another “Bhaṭa,” the famous physician Vāgbhaṭa, came from a family of Buddhist
doctors. Let us then turn to the case of the ancient Indian physicians and their possible ties to
Buddhism, and to heterodox traditions in general.

Hinduism and Medicine in Ancient India
The early twentieth-century German Indologist, H. Zimmer, was rather ambivalent about
the relationship of Buddhism, or at least its founder, to the Indian medical tradition. On one
hand, he claims that the Buddha (ca. 500 BCE) modeled his teachings of salvation or spiritual
healing upon the “the attitude of the Hindu physician” towards physical healing (Zimmer, 1948,
32). On the other, he remarks that the Buddha did not resort to the approach “of the priestly
teacher,” but rather “adopted the standpoint of a medical man on the spiritual plane” (1948, 34).
Left unclear is the general identity of “the medical man,” specifically, the extent to which he was
really a “Hindu physician.”
D. Chattopadhyaya is not ambivalent at all. The Indian medical tradition, in his view,
developed initially largely outside of and in opposition to the priestly, vedic schools and their
magico-mystical notions of healing. He readily acknowledges that a certain amount of
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anatomical knowledge, so essential to the training of physicians, was gained from the ancient
Brahmanical animal sacrifices, but such knowledge as was discovered led nowhere:
the sacrificial slaughter of animals must have made available to the priests some amount of
empirical data, which, rightly processed, could have developed into proto-anatomy of [the]
ancient period. But the fact is that this did not and could not develop in this direction.
(Chattopadhyaya , 1978, 274)
D. Chattopadhyaya attributes the scientific fruitlessness of vedic anatomical knowledge to the
Brahmanical custodians of this knowledge who were “interested only in the monstrous
mystification of it, so that it becomes part of their awe-inspiring ritual technique” (1978, 275).
He then cites the Śatapathabrāhmana passage that indulges in correlating the parts of the
sacrificial fire altar with the various parts of the animal body, concluding that in this ritualmystical “rigmarole” not even a “semblance of interest in anatomy proper” remains (1978, 275).
The promotion of obscure, mystical knowledge in the ritualistic Brāhmaṇa literature was
further developed in the metaphysical doctrines of the Upaniṣads, according to D.
Chattopadhyaya. Their emphasis on a supra-rational and anti-rational approach to knowledge
culminated in the idealist teachings of the Advaitin Śaṅkara and his rejection of reason (tarkā) as
an independent means of knowledge, while accepting it as possibly useful “to rationalise what is
already revealed in the scriptures” (Chattopadhyaya, 1978, 202).
In opposition to these antireason, antiscience perspectives of the metaphysicians, the actual
physicians were developing a rational-empirical medical science in which observation and
logical inference from the data were essential. Not only was such an approach based on an
epistemology rejected by metaphysical orthodoxy, but the empirical methodology also involved
contact with persons and substances considered polluting by the priestly authorities. We thus
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find many condemnations of medical practitioners in the metaphysical literature and law codes
of the Brahmanical authorities Chattopadhyaya, 1978, 97-98, 212-218; see also Zysk, 1991, 5).
The French Indologist J. Filliozat claimed that such condemnations merely reflected a sectarian
rivalry between two Vedic schools: “…one may believe that the Taittirīyas have fired a passing
shot at the rival school of the Carakas…” (1964, 21). He connects the alleged Vedic “Carakas”
with a medical lineage that eventually produced the great compilation of the Carakasaṃhitā. D.
Chattopadhyaya soundly refutes such an interpretation. He argues that Filliozat ignores, even
conceals “the fact that with the growth of the hierarchical aspirations in the Vedic tradition there
takes shape an ideology that proves inimical to medicine or ancient science in its most promising
form” (1978, 262).

K.G. Zysk, renowned scholar of Indian medicine, sides with D.

Chattopadhyaya:
Chattopadhyaya has shown this view [of Filliozat] to be untenable and asserts that the root
cause for priestly contempt of physicians derived from a clash of philosophical
perspectives between medicine’s fundamental empiricism and the priestly ideology that
emphasized esoteric knowledge. (Zysk, 1991, 23-24)
So who were those ancient Indians who took the first steps to develop a rational-empirical
medical science? During the several centuries between 800 and 100 BCE, this radically new
approach to healing was pioneered by “wandering physicians” who were excluded from
Brahmanical circles (Zysk, 1991, 5).

Ostracized by the orthodox hierarchy, they found

acceptance among the heterodox groups of ascetic mendicants, and “unhindered by brāhmaṇic
strictures and taboos, began to conceive an empirically and rationally based medical
epistemology ” (Zysk, 1991, 5). The means and goals of these new medical healers shared an
affinity with the Buddhist ideal of the Middle Way, of avoiding extreme self-denial and
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maintaining bodily health in equilibrium with the environment. K.G. Zysk points out that the
“symbiotic relationship between Buddhism and medicine” not only facilitated the spread of
Buddhism in Asia, but also led to Buddhist monastic communities playing a major role in “[t]he
codification of medical practices within the monastic rules [which] accomplished perhaps the
first systematization of Indian medical knowledge” (1991, 6). He summarizes the relationship
between the wandering renunciants and the new breed of physicians:
The connection between heterodox, particularly Buddhist, asceticism and medicine is
perhaps best illustrated through anatomy. The approach of the early Buddhists and the
physicians to an understanding of the human body reflects both a commitment to
materialism through empiricism and rationality and a firm rejection of brāhmaṇic
orthodoxy. (Zysk, 1991, 34)
Regarding the attainment of anatomical knowledge, one of the earliest accounts of how to
perform a human dissection is provided in the Suśrutasaṃhitā (extant form dating to the seventh
century CE at the latest [Chattopadhyaya, 1978, 43-44]). This text insists upon the necessity of
direct observation (pratyakśa [SuśrSa. 3.5.53]) of the body, including the dissected corpse. The
Suśrutasaṃhitā gives explicit directions for preparing a body for dissection, including the
squeezing out of excrement from the intestines (SuśrSa. 3.5.54; quoted in Chattopadhyaya, 1978,
95; Zysk, 1991, 35-36). As D. Chattopadhyaya points out, such instructions fly in the face of the
Brahminical advocacy of reliance on scripture, as well as flouting orthodox purity rules (1978,
97; see also Zysk, 1991, 36).
The Suśrutasaṃhitā, along with the Carakasaṃhitā (extant form dating to around the
fourth to sixth centuries CE [Chattopadhyaya, 1978, 32]) are the two major classical texts of
Ayurveda, often seen as epitomizing traditional “Hindu” medicine. D. Chattopadhyaya notes
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that “[t]he form in which the source-books of Indian medicine reaches us is apparently very
strange.

It is the assemblage of science and its opposite” (1978, 363).

The French

anthropologist F. Zimmermann also notes the intermingling of “the medical discourse” with “the
imaginary,” and sees these as part of a “single, homogenous discourse” (1987, 208). Thus, for
him, such distinctions have been introduced by western interpreters who fail to see that
“Ayurveda must be taken en bloc: it stands as a whole and single ‘myth,’ a whole and single
‘science’” (Zimmermann, 1987, 208). While he sees myth and science as a single entity in
traditional cultures, he also notes that such myth-science is quite different from modern science.
For instance, regarding traditional Indian classifications of animals as found in the ancient
bestiaries and reflected in ayurvedic catalogues, he first observes that there is “a lack of
differentiation between the real and the fabulous and a subordination of the biological to the
spiritual” (Zimmermann, 1987, 196). Then he makes the following conclusion: “But I fear that
there is no masking the fact that India proceeded no farther than the bestiary, whereas others [in
the Greco-Latin tradition] managed to escape from the enchantments of dharma, that ritualistic
vision of the universe, and invent the natural sciences” (Zimmermann, 1987, 196). Accordingly,
in traditional Hindu classifications of animals, which were pervaded by the idea that all are
subject to the cycle of rebirth, “the position of each category of beings is fixed by its function in
the system of ritual activities,” with minimal reference to “strictly biological classification”
(Zimmermann, 1987, 196).
F. Zimmermann’s emphasizing the different conceptions of science in traditional and
modern societies reminds us of M.A. Finocchiaro’s caution about the use of “essentialist,
anachronistic, or unhistorical” definitions of both science and religion. At the same time, more
than one conception of what constitutes science may exist in any given society. While the extant
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texts of the classical Ayurveda may represent some sort of myth-science, the actual history of the
texts and their internal contents points to a different explanation from F. Zimmermann’s for the
intermingling of the medical and the imaginary. For the texts have undergone repeated editing,
some parts being lost while others have been added, and there is no assurance that the various
editors, redactors, and compilers had the same goals in mind. This becomes especially clear in
light of the two contrasting and irreconcilable epistemologies in the texts themselves: the
mystical-magical of Brahminical orthodoxy, and the naturalistic methodologies of the wandering
physicians.
Like the Āryabhatīya, the extant Ayurvedic texts are said to be divinely revealed. But as
G. J. Meulenbeld says, “the divine character of āyurveda has been imposed upon it during a
particular state of its development and has not always been one of its characteristics” (2001, 2).
To the extent that Āyurveda is regarded as revealed, he suggests, it is not really science, as it
tends towards a closed system not open to “the progressive acquisition of knowledge”
(Meulenbeld, 2001, 3). But it was not completely closed, and thus “the doctrine of its divine
origin does not belong to its hard core” (2001, 3). K.G. Zysk similarly argues:
Probably during the early centuries of the common era, Hinduism assimilated the
storehouse of medical knowledge into its socioreligious intellectual tradition and by the
application of an orthodox veneer rendered it a brāhmaṇic science. (Zysk, 1991, 6)
Likewise, D. Chattopadhyaya regards the orthodox veneer as a defensive reaction by the
physicians, “a show of apparent piety as a protective crust for science” (1978, 363). He provides
several examples from the Carakasaṃhitā that deal with spiritual liberation, but he sees these as
merely “salvation superimposed on healing” (Chattopadhyaya, 1978, 372). Regarding these
references to salvational knowledge, he concludes: “Though redundant to medicine, their
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presence in the medical corpus is not purposeless, for they are presumably of the nature of
ransom offered to the counter-ideology without which it is not easy for the doctors to save their
science” (Chattopadhyaya, 1978, 375). At the same time, it was greatly to hinder the further
development of medical science. It was apparently not until 1836, at the new, British-established
Calcutta Medical College, that Hindu medical students again began to dissect human cadavers as
part of their training in practical anatomy—thereby ushering in modern, “rational scientific
medicine in India” (Bhattacharya, 2011, 1227). Nonetheless, the ancient texts, especially the
Carakasaṃhitā, retain the criteria for separating superstition from science (Chattopadhyaya,
1978, 201-209).

These criteria include commitment to empiricism, causal law, rigorous

reasoning, and “intra-disciplinary discussion and debate” (Chattopadhyaya, 1978, 208)—the
latter perhaps an ancient equivalent to today’s peer review.

The tensions apparent in the

Suśrutasaṃhitā and Carakasaṃhitā between Brahmanic orthodoxy and medical empiricism
point clearly to the fact that religion and science are social practices, at times overlapping, but
often resulting in conflict, however veiled (compare Stenmark, 2010, 292).
I noted above that Śaṅkara subordinated reason to scripture. All the Vedāntic schools,
including Advaita, subordinated not just reason, but perception as well, effectively enshrining a
critical epistemic tension between Vedānta and modern science. Deepening this tension was the
notion put forth by some philosophers such as Udayana of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school that there
are two kinds of perception: supernatural (alaukika) and ordinary (laukika; Brown, 2012, 45).
The former, call it transcendent vision, intuition, or yogic perception, available only to the
disciplined and virtuous, provides direct and immediate experience of God and reality,
unmediated by reasoning or scripture. At the same time, Nyāya and other philosophers critically
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examined the epistemic liabilities of experience in general, including such direct experience as
yogic perception.
In concluding this section on ancient and classical science in India, let me draw once again
on D. Chattopadhyaya.

He calls attention to a very early debate in Hindu philosophical

speculations regarding the ultimate causal agents underlying the manifest universe.

In the

Śvetāśvataropaniṣad (6.1-2) the possible agents named include God, time, chance or accident,
and innate nature (svabhāva) (Chattopadhyaya, 1991, 55-61; see also Brown, 2012, 15-16). This
latter view insists that the universe and its constituent elements evolve by their own inherent
power and causal efficacy, independent of any manipulating God or emanating supernatural
consciousness. This naturalistic perspective, D. Chattopadhyaya reasonably asserts, underlay the
development of natural science in classical times, and is clearly seen in the case of early Indian
medical science (1991, 70). D. Chattopadhyaya further comments: “In the clash between ‘the
doctrine of God’ and ‘the doctrine of nature’[svabhāva], therefore, we have perhaps the earliest
glimpse of the conflict between religion and science that took place in Indian history”
(Chattopadhyaya 1991, 60).
Yet outright conflict may not have been inevitable. While the Śvetāśvataropaniṣad may
have pointed to a clash, the Muṇḍakopaniṣad suggests another possible model for the Hinduism
and science relationship. The Muṇḍakopaniṣad (1.1.5) sets forth the notion that there are two
vidyās or “sciences” hierarchically arranged. The higher knowledge (parāvidyā) is that “by
which one grasps the imperishable [akṣara; the ultimate reality known generally in the
Upaniṣads as brahman]” (Olivelle, 1998, 437). The lower (aparāvidyā) consists of the four
Vedas and their six traditional ancillary limbs: phonetics, rituals, grammar, etymology, prosody,
and astronomy. The lower science, or sciences, incomplete in themselves, promotes attaining
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knowledge of the higher science of brahman. This line of thought was further developed by
Śaṅkara, who posited two levels of knowledge—(1) the worldly, in which subject and object are
experienced as separate, and (2) the ultimate level in which one realizes the unity of all being,
the identity of subject and object, of self and brahman. Perception and inference are competent
only for dealing with the somewhat illusory empirical world but fail to warrant any metaphysical
truth (Hiriyanna, 1932, 358).

This subordination model, while perhaps avoiding outright

warfare, hardly provides much inducement for the pursuit of the lower natural sciences, nor does
it eliminate possible incompatible teachings about the empirical world on the part of religion visà-vis scientific claims, whether the religious teachings are derived from scripture or from
inspired visions of ultimate reality. In the colonial period the “two sciences” model was to be
taken up and revised by Hindus as a major strategy in dealing with the challenges of modernity
and modern science arriving from Europe.

Hinduism and Science in the Colonial and Postcolonial Periods
Many of the epistemological and metaphysical issues of the ancient and classical periods
lay dormant for many centuries, until the coming of the Europeans. Under colonial rule, these
issues soon revived, as the English-educated Hindus faced the dilemma common to “any elite
that accepts the task of integrating the religion, the values, and the social systems of a traditional
society with the thought and practices exported from the colonial centres in Europe” (Brekke,
1999, 204). Among the many challenges, that of modern science with its inherent skepticism
towards traditional knowledge, along with the accompanying technology, was the most
momentous (Halbfass, 1988, 399).
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B.V. Subharayappa notes that the first impression Indians had of “western science” was
through the various “botanical, zoological, geological, meteorological, and geographical”
surveys commissioned by the colonial administration (2011, 199). He adds that “[t]he European
investigators brought with them a commitment to experimentation, observation, and rational
thinking.

Their superior methodologies highlighted the inherent weakness of traditional

knowledge” (Subharayappa , 2011, 199). The Indian elite in the nineteenth century sensed their
own current scientific backwardness, combined with an intense admiration of, and an often
unquestioning acceptance of the authority of modern, evidence-based science. These attitudes
intermingled with the conviction that India’s subjection to and oppression by western colonial
power was due, at least in part, to the West’s superior mastery of science and technology.
The conviction of their scientific inferiority soon led the Hindu elite to call for British
investment in science education for the natives.

As early as 1823, Rammohan Roy petitioned

the British administration for the instruction of Indians by European teachers in the subjects of
“Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, Chemistry, Anatomy, and other useful sciences…” (Roy,
1978, 472). At the same time, Roy insisted that the world was indebted to India where the
knowledge of science, as well as of literature and religion, first dawned (1978, 906; Brown,
2012, 87). With Roy we see the first manifestation of one of the overriding problems pervading
the Hinduism-and science-discourse in colonial India: the tension between the image of science
as a free and universal inquiry “unaffected by its historical and cultural locations,” on one hand,
and its advancement of such claims “only in its particular history as imperial knowledge,” on the
other (Prakash, 1999, 71).
To meet the challenges posed by modern science, Hindus developed various modes and
models of cultural negotiation in their attempt to reaffirm traditional religious and social values
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within some sort of universal, scientifically sanctioned—or at least scientifically compatible—
framework.

We find among the various negotiating strategies six persistent and often

interrelated or overlapping themes (compare Halbfass, 1988, 399).
The first and perhaps earliest was that India was the fountainhead of all sciences and
culture, although such a magnificent past is obscured by India’s present state of degeneration.
This notion, as we have seen, was already proffered by Rammohan Roy and reflected the idea of
an ancient Vedic Golden Age proposed by European Orientalists early in the nineteenth century.
Later elaborations of this model led to the idea of vedic science and the radical scientizing of the
vedic tradition, finding in the ancient scriptures such modern technological inventions as
electricity, airplanes, telegraphy—as in the writings of Dayananda Saraswati—and more
recently, transplant surgery and subatomic physics.

Basic scientific discoveries were also

uncovered in the ancient scriptures and sayings of the seers, including, the law of gravity, of the
conservation of energy, and of evolution—the latter two emphasized in Vivekananda’s writings.
Advocates of vedic science seek to find vedic equivalents to modern scientific ideas and
discoveries, but are almost always forced to make quite arbitrary and unconvincing linkages
based on highly subjective textual interpretations, or rely on vague surface similarities.
A second approach called for mutual supplementation often involving the idea of
exchange between India and the West. Europe could teach to India its science and technology,
while India could benefit the West with its spirituality, an approach well exemplified by
Vivekananda. While impressed by the dazzling radiance of evidence-based “Western” science
and its potential to help India’s poor, Vivekananda took it upon himself to bring the wisdom of
Vedānta to what he saw as the spiritually impoverished West (Brekke, 1999, 204). A variant of
this perspective was to advocate the adoption of western technology but to eschew the “scientific
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temper” with its corrosive skepticism and materialist predisposition—an approach evident in the
contemporary Hindutva movement and dubbed by Meera Nanda as “reactionary modernism”
(2003, 37).
A third strategy was to disarm Western science by relegating it to a sphere outside or below
a higher, spiritual science. This was accomplished in part by acknowledging the superiority of
European study of the external world, but insisting on the pre-eminence of Hindu investigations
of the inner world of consciousness. This resonated with and was accommodated to the ancient
Muṇḍakopaniṣad idea of two hierarchical sciences, resulting in the notion of a higher, spiritual
science and a lower, material (modern, “Western”) science. Modern science is thus not wrong
but limited.
This model of two hierarchical sciences we already see developing with Debendranath
Tagore (1817-1905), who maintained that God is invisible to the outer senses but visible to the
inner eye of knowledge. This inner eye he commonly referred to as intuition based on inner
conviction (ātmapratyaya), which itself is grounded in our innate knowledge of god (Brown,
2012, 97). Debendranath’s notion of inner conviction utilizes European ideas of intuition and
self-evident truth, and is a radical reinterpretation of the Upaniṣadic notion of inner conviction
focused on non-dual knowledge of the one Self (Halbfass, 1988, 224, 396, 570n). He then
related this to the notion of the two vidyās of the Muṇḍakopaniṣad: the higher knowledge of the
ultimate attained through intuition, and the lower knowledge of the empirical and rational
sciences. He expanded the lower sciences to include such natural sciences as geology, medicine,
and psychology, as well as philosophy and theology (Halbfass, 1988, 98). This model of the two
hierarchical sciences was further developed by Vivekananda and became a standard strategy of
twentieth- and twenty-first-century Hindus dealing with the challenges of modern science,
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especially Darwinian evolution. Interestingly, recent researches in consciousness or meditation
studies have sought to obtain verification from the natural sciences of the contemplative truths of
the inner science and thus to prove “the concordance of both approaches” (Halbfass, 1988, 399).
A significant modification of the two-sciences model, in which the methodological
approaches of science and religion are equated, results in a further scientizing of tradition
encompassing both substantive claims and epistemic processes. This modified version, the
fourth approach, identifies yogic or contemplative experience with scientific empiricism.
Religion and science are thus viewed as one, not as two different sciences (compare Prakash,
1999, 76-77). But whereas scientific empiricism is conjoined with rigorous peer review and an
openness to disconfirming evidence and arguments, yogic experience is not similarly openended. Rather, yogis, while at times comparing subjective experiences, have no real means for
testing the true equivalence of such personal experiences, and in any case, are strongly
predisposed merely to confirm truths already known and promulgated by the ancients (Brown,
2012, 230-231). In addition, different contemplative traditions frequently come to radically
different conclusions regarding what the nature of the reality is that is immediately experienced.
The Hindu classical tradition was well aware of the problematic nature of personal experience
and of the psychological sense of certainty that may result from such experience. In particular,
Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers did not fail “to distinguish very clearly between psychological
factuality and epistemological validity” (Halbfass, 1988, 394).
The fifth strategy, not so common but still significant, was selectively to accept certain
findings of modern science while rejecting others as either not scientific, or at best,
misinterpretations of scientific data. Thus, cosmic evolution may be acceptable, while organic
evolution is not—as seen in Dayananda Saraswati and his followers, and among later
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conservative theistic movements like International Society for Krishna Consciousness and the
International Society of Divine Love.
The sixth and last strategy developed by the Hindu elite was to accept the superiority of
modern science to traditional forms of knowledge, while still finding aspects of the tradition that
were not in conflict with modern science (Prakash, 1999, 57-58). Such was the approach of B.
Chattopadhyaya, whose critique of ancient Indian science we have already encountered. At the
same time, he saw in the Hindu Trinity of Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Śiva a doctrine of creation,
preservation, and destruction in accord with Darwinian theory, in contrast to what he saw as
conflicting Christian notions of an omnipotent god (Prakash, 1999, 57-58; Brown, 2012, 77).
Regarding certain of these strategies, D. Chattopadhyaya notes that the attempt to read
modern science into the Vedas, on the basis of the supposed penetrating intuitive insights of the
ancient seers, was understandable in the colonial period.

But such a perspective in post-

Independence times “has lost its relevance” and is “a factor inhibiting the real development of
modern science in India” (Chattopadhyaya, 1986, 399).

Conclusion: Social Contexts and Cognitive Foundations
M.A. Finocchiaro stresses that the relationships between science and religion have been
“much richer and more complex than the notions of conflict and harmony can convey” (2001,
114-115). He notes that recent scholarship has suggested a wide variety of possible relationships
between the two ventures, including separation, dialogue, integration, and subordination. And
within these, there are many more significant distinctions. The Hindu traditions nicely illustrate
these complex, and changing, relationships.
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At the same time, we have found that among the various conceptions of science and/or
knowledge emerging at various times in India’s history, something akin to the modern notion of
science as a rational-empirical enterprise has been present from ancient times. And both in
classical and colonial/post-colonial periods, strategies were developed to deal with conflicts and
tensions, in order to effect some sort of reconciliation. The orthodox Hindu philosophers of the
classical period were able to diminish tensions by comprehending natural science and its radical
epistemic methods within an overarching and supernaturalistic metaphysical framework that
effectively tamped down conflict, but at the price of undermining the scientific enterprise.
Conflict was concealed. Science is a fragile social enterprise, and it was simply not sufficiently
robust in ancient and classical times to withstand the Brahmanical takeover. During the last two
centuries, science has been too impressive, successful, if you will, both in its prowess in creating
technological spinoffs and in its ability to explain the natural world to be dismissed or disarmed
in quite so facile a fashion.
To explain the fragility of the scientific enterprise, the philosopher of science R.N.
McCauley points to the cognitive foundations underlying both science and religion. He notes on
the one hand that religion is “primarily dependent on the natural proclivities of the human mind,”
and thus is found in all cultures (2011, 236). Specifically, this natural proclivity includes an
extreme sensitivity for detecting intention or conscious agency in phenomena and events that—
while serving survival needs—may well over-detect or intuit conscious agency where none
exists. Science, on the other hand, is dependent on comparatively rare social arrangements that
foster “mastery of both norms of reasoning and radically counterintuitive conceptions” and
“public availability of the pivotal processes, products, and evidence” (McCauley, 2011, 236).
Science thus requires considerable institutional support, but its disciplined skepticism combined
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with its frequent, radically counterintuitive conclusions tends to undermine social, political, and
religious (and even scientific) vested interests, thereby risking loss of support and endangering
its persistence (McCauley, 2011, 280-281). Such a dynamic is precisely what we see in the
development of science in ancient and classical India.
One approach to handling these conflicting interests that currently attracts many within the
Hindu community is to adopt an updated version of the two-sciences model, an approach called
by S.J. Gould NOMA (“Nonoverlapping Magisteria” ). For instance, S. Menon, a researcher in
consciousness studies sympathetic to the Advaita Vedānta perspective, proclaims that: “[f]aith is
not opposed to reason since they deal with different domains” (2006, 11). More specifically, she
regards “reason and experiments” as characterizing the domain of science, while “selfpurification,” as well as “inner transformation, and ontological insights” she sees as refined
means of knowledge pertaining to the domain of religion and spirituality (Menon, 2006, 10).
From her Advaita perspective, the supreme reality, the parabrahman that is pure consciousness,
transcends all dualisms such as matter and spirit, God and world, and thus there can be no
ultimate conflict between science and religion.
R.N. McCauley, however, critiques S.J. Gould’s NOMA principle as inevitably
unsustainable in practice, since religious thinkers of a NOMA bent sooner or later backslide into
making empirical claims that invoke the necessary agency of some trans-empirical entity. But
this transgresses any strict adherence to the NOMA principle, which regards the trans-empirical
agent—and thus its effects in the empirical world— as basically inaccessible by scientific means
(McCauley, 2011, 244-245). In the Hindu context, that trans-empirical entity may well be the
non-dual Brahman or God of Advaita rather than an extra-cosmic creator god. As Menon states:
“Hindu enlightenment is seeing God in every bit of the world…” (2006, 11), but science sees no
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such presence, as it is undetectable, and in any case, an unnecessary hypothesis for explaining
how the world works. Accordingly, some level of tension seems inevitable between science and
religion, including Hinduism, for as McCauley concludes: “Religions presume that the most
penetrating accounts of the world will always, ultimately, look to agent causality. Science does
not” (2011, 236).
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